Bug #2655
closedGET/POST HTTP-request with no Content-Length, http_client_body miss
Description
Hello, Team!
We've run into troubles with a few threats variants.
Let's imagine some sort of malware which tries to steal a user information.
There are several methods, but one of them is simply send a data via POST request:
POST /... HTTP/1.1 Host: ... ... Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 22 login=foo&password=*bar*
Below is a simple rule example:
alert http any any -> any any ( \ msg:"TEST 'no Content-Length' vs http_client_body"; \ flow:to_server,established; \ content:"login=foo&password=bar"; http_client_body; \ classtype:trojan-activity; \ sid:1; rev:1;)
Let's imagine that a threat actor will manualy remove the 'Content-Length' option from HTTP header:
POST /... HTTP/1.1 Host: ... ... login=foo&password=*bar4*
In this case according to HTTP specification a request will be wrong.
But from a network transport side it's not a problem and a packet will be successfully transferred.
The same can be done with GET method although this technique is not recommended.
I've attached two pcap dumps as example.
I've also played a bit with 'Content-Type' and 'Content-Length' options in each session.
As a result, Suricata doesn't detect the body content with 'http_client_body' modifier in cases when 'Content-Length' is absent.
We'll have the same result if just change the 'Content-Length' value to a smaller one: Content-Length: 22 -> Content-Length: 20
A default HTTP server will return an error because it will not resolve a 'login=foo&password=bar' combination as HTTP method of a new request.
But it's up to us how we'll configure our HTTP server.
I believe that removing or reducing the 'Content-Length' field value is a quite easy trick to bypass Suricata detection with http_client_body modifier for a pattern.
I suggest to improve a body length recognizing logic and not to be based on 'Content-Length' value only.
Thank you.
Sincerely yours, Alexey Vishnyakov
Files
Updated by Victor Julien almost 6 years ago
- Status changed from New to Assigned
- Assignee set to Philippe Antoine
- Target version set to 5.0beta1
Updated by Philippe Antoine almost 6 years ago
Thank you Alexey for this report.
From what I understand, the attacker controlled in your case both the client and the server.
And so, he used a slightly different protocol than HTTP.
Yet this slight difference (removing Content-Length header and delimiting content with end of line) is enough to make parsing fail.
As you rightly pointed out, such an attacker could use other schemes, such as using a modified value for Content_Length (-2 when you write it, +2 when you read it)
Another option would be to rename the Content-Length header into Data-Length for instance.
We can imagine many more such schemes.
So, I do not see how Suricata can rightly parse all these slightly different HTTP.
However, things can be done :
- Suricata should report better that there is a parsing error
I proposed these pull requests :
https://github.com/OISF/libhtp/pull/190
https://github.com/OISF/suricata/pull/3704
https://github.com/OISF/suricata-verify/pull/22
- Rules writing should use http_method instead of http_client_body as login=foo&password=bar is indeed parsed as a method by Suricata, and by Apache in your post.pcap
Wireshark parses it as unknown data in a new request (ie different from the POST request)
Updated by Philippe Antoine almost 6 years ago
There are new pull requests :
- https://github.com/OISF/libhtp/pull/191
- https://github.com/OISF/suricata/pull/3705
- https://github.com/OISF/suricata-verify/pull/24
With these, we can have a signature such as
alert http any any -> any any (msg:"test"; flow:established,to_server; content:"login=foo&password=bar"; http_client_body; app-layer-event:http.request_body_unexpected; sid:1; rev:1;)
Updated by Victor Julien over 5 years ago
- Target version changed from 5.0beta1 to 5.0rc1
Updated by Victor Julien about 5 years ago
- Copied to Bug #3187: GET/POST HTTP-request with no Content-Length, http_client_body miss (4.1.x) added
Updated by Victor Julien about 5 years ago
- Status changed from Assigned to Closed