GET/POST HTTP-request with no Content-Length, http_client_body miss
We've run into troubles with a few threats variants.
Let's imagine some sort of malware which tries to steal a user information.
There are several methods, but one of them is simply send a data via POST request:
POST /... HTTP/1.1 Host: ... ... Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 22 login=foo&password=*bar*
Below is a simple rule example:
alert http any any -> any any ( \ msg:"TEST 'no Content-Length' vs http_client_body"; \ flow:to_server,established; \ content:"login=foo&password=bar"; http_client_body; \ classtype:trojan-activity; \ sid:1; rev:1;)
Let's imagine that a threat actor will manualy remove the 'Content-Length' option from HTTP header:
POST /... HTTP/1.1 Host: ... ... login=foo&password=*bar4*
In this case according to HTTP specification a request will be wrong.
But from a network transport side it's not a problem and a packet will be successfully transferred.
The same can be done with GET method although this technique is not recommended.
I've attached two pcap dumps as example.
I've also played a bit with 'Content-Type' and 'Content-Length' options in each session.
As a result, Suricata doesn't detect the body content with 'http_client_body' modifier in cases when 'Content-Length' is absent.
We'll have the same result if just change the 'Content-Length' value to a smaller one: Content-Length: 22 -> Content-Length: 20
A default HTTP server will return an error because it will not resolve a 'login=foo&password=bar' combination as HTTP method of a new request.
But it's up to us how we'll configure our HTTP server.
I believe that removing or reducing the 'Content-Length' field value is a quite easy trick to bypass Suricata detection with http_client_body modifier for a pattern.
I suggest to improve a body length recognizing logic and not to be based on 'Content-Length' value only.
Sincerely yours, Alexey Vishnyakov